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I. INTRODUCTION
As debate over the function and administration of the insan-
ity defense has heightened in recent years, abolition of the de-
fense has become an increasingly serious alternative.' The Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary is now considering one such
proposal. Section 522 of the proposed Criminal Justice Re-
form Act of 1975,2 popularly known as S. 1, states a viable de-
fense if "the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense
charged. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense."
Born of frustrations over the administration of the insanity
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, A.B. 1965, University of
North Carolina; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago.
1 For the abolitionist positions, see, e.g., S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS
OF CRIME 212-28, 341-42 (1967); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
24-25 (1964); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 123-46 (1963); B. WOOTTON,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963); Goldstein, The Brawner Rule-Why? or No More
Nonsense on Non Sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126; Goldstein &
Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Morris, Psychiatry
and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968). Dean Morris' article contains a
summarization of the various positions in an appendix. Id. 544-47.
For arguments that the insanity defense be retained, see, e.g., H. FINGARETTE, THE
MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 1-15 (1972); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE
222-26 (1967); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 131-35 (1968); Brady,
Abolish the Insanity Defense?-No!, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 629 (1971); Kadish, The Decline of
Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968); Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 719 (1973).
Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the Federal Insanity Defense: A Critique, 10 CAL. WESTERN L.
REv. 449 (1974), discusses constitutional objections to the Nixon Administration's aboli-
tion proposals, but does not consider the manner in which judicial construction can
undercut abolition through an expanded version of mens rea. See text accompanying notes
100-31 infra.
2 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). All citations to S. 1 in this Article refer to the
Committee Print of May 16, 1975.
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defense, the death of the Durham experiment,3 and the rising
influence of the behaviorist position,4 the abolitionist argument
has become respectable for liberal and conservative alike. A
forerunner to section 522 was proposed by a consultant to the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
(Brown Commission) in 1970 but was rejected by the
Commission. 5 Abolition of the insanity defense reemerged in the
Nixon Administration bill in 19736 and has remained in the
Judiciary Committee's bill ever since.
Section 522 is abolitionist in the sense of eliminating a
"separate insanity defense."'7 Although evidence of mental dis-
ease or defect is admissible if it tends to negate the mental ele-
3See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), overruling
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
The Durham experiment was itself born of frustrations over what Judge Bazelon and
his colleagues on the District of Columbia Circuit considered the limited scope of expert
psychiatric testimony under the M'Naghten rule, M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843). See Durham, supra at 866-74. Largely indigenous to the District of Columbia
Circuit (New Hampshire has followed a similar rule for nearly a century, see, e.g., State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870)), Durham exculpated from criminal punishment those individu-
als whose forbidden acts were "the product of a mental disease or defect." Durham, supra
at 874-75. The standard underwent great flux before its demise. See Carter v. United
States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (requiring "but for" causation); Blocker v. United
States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (requiring updated expert testimony
on whether a sociopathic personality disturbance is to be considered a mental disease or
defect); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (defining
mental disease or defect); Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(criticizing conclusory psychiatric labels). Finally, in Brawner, the District of Columbia
Circuit-with Judge Bazelon concurring in part and dissenting in part, Brawner, supra at
1010-39-rejected the Durham rule, citing as its chief defect the domination of the trier of
fact by expert medical and psychiatric witnesses on the issue of insanity, id. at 977-78.
The court adopted a modified version of the American Law Institute rule. Compare id. at
990-94, 1006 n.82, 1008, with MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Though now abandoned and largely unsuccessful in accomplishing its stated goals,
Durham at least proved fruitful in stimulating scholarly and judicial debate on the nature
and purposes of the insanity defense. See Brawner, supra at 976.
4 See, e.g., B. WOOTTON, supra note 1; Monahan, supra note 1, at 733-38.
The behaviorist position stresses that free will is an illusion and that behavior is
conditioned by numerous forces, so that the sole function of the criminal law should be
to modify the personalities of those committing antisocial acts. Accordingly, insanity
becomes relevant only at the sentencing-dispositional stage. See H. PACKER, supra note 1,
at 12.
5 See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws 234 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
6 S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1973): "It is a defense to a prosecution under
any federal criminal statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense."
7 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION, AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, at 111 n.73
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY COMI. STAFF REPORT].
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ment (mens rea) of a crime, it does not constitute a general de-
fense of excuse. Proponents are fond of the illustration of the
man who strangles his wife believing he is merely squeezing
lemons.8 His defense is that he lacked the intent to kill another
human being. His need for introducing evidence of mental dis-
ease would be to give credibility to his story. 9 If section 522 is
indeed restricted to such delusional mistakes of fact, then the
draftsmen have succeeded in largely abolishing the insanity de-
fense as we now know it.
Two problems are posed. First, one may question whether
such alteration of the insanity defense can coexist with an other-
wise rather traditional structure of criminal liability and defenses
without standing the logic of that structure on its head. This
question poses corollary issues of policy and constitutional
interpretation.' 0 Second, one may question whether judicial con-
struction of this "decidely opaque"" provision will conform to
the expectations of the draftsmen. Distinguished students of the
insanity defense have inferred a remarkably broad range of in-
terpretations of the meaning and effect of section 522.12
8 ld. 106. The illustration is drawn from MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 2
(Tent. Draft No, 4, 1955).
9 Given the redundancy between §§ 522 and 521 (mistake of fact or law), see notes
101-10 infra & accompanying text, it is unclear whether the trier of fact must find that
the defendant had a mental disease or defect as -a precondition to allowing a defense in
the lemon-squeezing illustration. Section 522 implies that such a finding of fact is neces-
sary, as does § 3617(c)(4)(B), which requires the expert witness' conclusion on that issue.
Yet the defendant's proof would be simplified if he could bring his defense under § 521;
and, if successful, he could win outright acquittal rather than the special verdict of
acquittal by reason of insanity with its accompanying civil commitment procedures under
§ 3612-13. See note 31 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 13-99 infra. The due process clause may well be
offended by either partial or total abolition, text accompanying notes 84-99 infra.
I IHearings on S. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XII, at 219 (1975) (statement of Chief
Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
'2 While there is a very vague intent to restrict the insanity defense, the use of
the terms "mental disease or defect" ambiguously indicates some form of
Durham-like experimentation. . . . [T]he Section could be read as endorsing
either the view of the court in Brawner on the role of the jury or the view
expressed in my dissenting opinion.
Id. 288 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.).
"The ... approach is strikingly reminiscent of the Durham rule." Hearings on S. 1 &
S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. VIII, at 6381 (1973) (statement of Prof. Abraham S.
Goldstein) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
"In effect, S. I abolishes the defense of insanity, since lack of the required criminal
intent is a defense, independent of insanity, in any case." Schwartz, A Proposal to Overhaul
the Federal Criminal Laws, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4, col. 5.
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II. THE LEMON SQUEEZING VIEW
If we take the draftsmen at their word, section 522 would
exculpate mistakes of fact arising from grossly abnormal ideation
and little else. 13 The lemon-squeezing spouse-killer would be ac-
quitted if the jury were persuaded that he literally thought that
his wife was a lemon.' 4 But if the same defendant was spurred to
kill by voices, by a prolonged depression, or by an uncontrollable
rage associated with a tumor or other organic damage, he should
be convicted.' 5 Not only would the defense discriminate against
particular types of disorders-particularly the affective disorders
such as manic-depressive psychosis-but it would also discrimi-
nate among phases of delusions arising from a single thought
disorder. Thus our lemon-fixated defendant who dispatches his
wife while trying to grip her firmly to prevent her turning into a
lemon is guilty of reckless homicide.'
6
Beneath this interpretation of section 522 lies the criminal
law's traditional objective view of mens rea. The defendant is
assumed to be a rational being exercising free choice. 17 Grada-
tions of culpability are geared to the actor's awareness of his
conduct, the circumstances in which he acts, and the conse-
quences of his conduct, as well as to an evaluation of the ob-
jective conduct, circumstances, and consequences themselves.' 8
13 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 106. Similarly, if A suffers
from paranoid delusions that B is trying to kill him, and A kills B, A would be entitled to
an imperfect defense of self-defense, reducing his crime to reckless or negligent
homicide. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 544(b) (1975).
14 Actually he could be convicted of negligent homicide, S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §
1603 (1975), unless the subjective aspect of negligence--"a reasonable person ... in such
a situation," id. § 302-were enlarged to include his mental abnormality. See Kadish, supra
note 1, at 280.5 
See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107 n.64.
16 A similar case occurred recently in Washington, D. C. Defendant, waiting at a bus
stop, perceived that a woman stranger standing near him was rapidly changing shapes.
He proceeded to throttle her-as he explained it, to make her stay in one form so that he
could talk to her. The woman was near death when the man was pulled away by onlook-
ers. The police, rather than booking him, delivered him to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for
reasons of convenience to the police, and the man was civilly committed. No criminal
charges were filed. Conversation between Herbert M. Silverberg, Chief, Mental Health
Division, Public Defender Service, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C., and the
author, Dec. 3, 1974.
17 "Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the
vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and
doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250 n.4 (1952), (quoting Pound, Introduction to F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW
xxxvi-xxxvii (1927)). See also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir.
1954). 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20-21.
18 "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to
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Therefore, the only way to negate mens rea, strictly speaking, is to
demonstrate the absence of awareness of the conduct, circum-
stances, or consequences to which the mens rea applies. In so
doing, one never reaches the underlying assumption that the
defendant is a rational being.
Mens rea has not always been so narrow a construct.' 9 Terms
such as "malice, .... premeditation," and "deliberation" have from
time to time incorporated into the criminal law qualitative con-
cepts of culpability beyond mere awareness of conduct, circum-
stances, and consequences. Recent codification efforts, however,
including sections 301 and 302 of S. 1, have followed the lead of
the Model Penal Code in refining a more objective concept of
mens rea. 20 Thus, the lemon-squeezing view of section 522 is con-
sistent with the emerging view of mens rea.
But what of the underlying assumption of free will? The
Model Penal Code and virtually every code derived from it pro-
vide at least two defenses unrelated to mens rea that may negate
the threshold capacity for free choice assumed by the criminal
law. One, the automatism or involuntariness defense, negates a
prescribed element of the crime, the requirement of a voluntary
act or omission.2' The other, the insanity defense, assumes a
voluntary or conscious act and is directed at substantial impair-
ments to the capacity for free choice arising from mental disorder.
22
Together, the two defenses suggest a concept of culpability
broader than that reflected by the element of mens rea.23 It is
only when the two-step hurdle of minimal capacity for free
choice has been crossed-whether by presumption or by the
state's overcoming defense evidence-that the more refined
measures of culpability contained in the mens rea element
are brought into play. Yet neither defense exists on the face
of S. 1.24
him, and that conduct is forbidden by law under those circumstances, he intentionally
breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent." Ellis v. United
States, 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1907).
19 See generally Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMe. L.J. 31
(1936).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See generally
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 179-81 (1972).
22 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
23 Other defenses, such as duress, self-defense, and provocation, also tend to reflect
a broader, more subjective notion of culpability. See generally notes 111-13 infra & accom-
panying text.
2 4 See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102, 111 (1975). But see id. § 501 (defenses listed
in S. 1 are not exclusive).
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A. The Committee's Rationale
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Staff Report 25 does not
directly confront the significant changes in the culpability con-
cept implied in the lemon-squeezing interpretation of section
522. Rather, the Report criticizes current formulations of the
insanity defense as vague, wasteful, and inefficient and urges
simple abolition of the inquiry into concepts of responsibility in
favor of more efficient procedures for sorting out and designat-
ing for treatment those offenders exhibiting psychopathology of
any variety.2 6 "The critical issue is seen as one of disposition.
27
Indeed, the Report advances the novel argument2 8 that dis-
positional proceedings constitute a proper forum for determin-
ing culpability.
[T]he stigma attached to a determination of criminality
will be materially mitigated at the sentencing stage by
publicly adjudging [persons convicted under S. 1 who
would have been acquitted under other insanity tests] to
be deserving of proper medical care rather than deserv-
ing of a punitive sentence of imprisonment. The nature
of the disposition ... will constitute society's recognition
of the defendant's lack of moral culpability for his
offense.
2 9
Dean Morris has argued that the current practice of deliver-
ing a special verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity combined
with the commitment of insanity acqriittees amounts to double
stigmatization of the defendant as both bad and mad.30 Surely a
criminal conviction combined with commitment to a psychiatric
facility for criminals will not ameliorate the stigma visited upon
this unfortunate class.3 ' Furthermore, hospitalization of a con-
25 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7.
26 These procedures can be found in S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1975).
2 7
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 106.
28 See B. WOOTTON, supra note I. In contrast to the Woottonian position, which
attempts to eliminate all elements of culpability, the S. 1 abolitionist approach would
apparently retain culpability while allowing psychiatric evidence at the dispositional hear-
ing of an offender convicted because he was unable to establish a mistake-of-fact defense
based on mental disease or defect.
2 9
JUDICIARY COMNIM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107.
30 Morris, supra note 1, at 524-25.
"1 See Kadish, supra note 1, at 283; Monahan, supra note 1, at 729-3 1. For those few
who may be acquitted under § 522, the same, less formal double stigmatization occurs.
Defendants are accorded a "special verdict" of "not guilty by reason of insanity" under §
3612 and are subjected to proceedings under § 3613 to determine whether they should
be indefinitely hospitalized as mentally ill and dangerous.
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victed person under S. 1 occurs when the person is found to be
suffering from a mental disease or defect and in need of
treatment, 32 so that persons who might have been acquitted
under other insanity tests will be grouped with all other prison-
ers who might benefit from psychiatric care, whether or not
their mental disabilities contributed to their criminal conduct.
Finally, disposition occurs without a jury33 and in substantial
reliance on a psychiatrist's opinion as to the prisoner's present
mental condition. Culpability is simply not in issue.
On a practical level, substituting criminal sentences with
medical treatment for the idefinite commitments usually given to
persons acquitted under current insanity tests is no favor to the
accused, despite the Committee's suggestion to the contrary.
34
Maximum sentences under S. 1 are already substantial, and sec-
tion 3616 permits indefinite commitment of prisoners whose
sentences have expired but who are found to be mentally ill and
dangerous. A convicted person is compelled to receive psychiat-
ric treatment under sections 3614 and 3615 until he is no longer
in need of treatment, whereas section 3613 requires treatment of
the insanity acquittee only so long as he is mentally ill and
dangerous. When the prisoner is discharged from treatment, he
may have to return to prison for the remainder of his sentence, 35
a factor that may discourage discharge.3 6 In short, convicting
those who might otherwise win insanity acquittals subjects such
32 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3614(d), 3615(d) (1975). Because of its extreme
breadth and flexibility, the standard "in need of treatment" raises serious policy and
constitutional questions. Some psychiatrists would view almost any prisoner to be in need
of treatment. See, e.g., Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric
Association, 19 J. C iM. L.C. & P.S. 367, 373 (1928). For the argument that "commitment
on these grounds [mentally ill or in need of treatment] is of necessity a completely
arbitrary act," see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 748 (1974). See also Developments in the
Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1212-19 (1974).
33 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3614(d), 3615(d) (1975); see 1973 Hearings, supra note
11, at 6379; Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance,
10 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 559, 583 n.103 (1972).
34 JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 108-09.
3' Persons committed while they are serving prison sentences, S. 1, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3615 (1975), must be returned to prison for the remainder of their sentences
upon discharge from the hospital, id. § 3615 (e). However, persons committed after
conviction but prior to sentencing, id. § 3614, may, upon discharge from the hospital,
obtain adjustment of sentence, id. § 3614(e). The tradeoff is that § 3614 commitments
are given provisional maximum sentences for their offenses at the time of commitment,
id. § 3614(d).
36 Some psychiatrists may be reluctant to return patients to prison for fear that the
prison environment will occasion a relapse. Should this occur in the context of § 3614
commitments, persons so committed would in effect be receiving automatic maximum
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persons to incarceration for a period determined by their past
criminal conduct as well as by their future propensities, whereas
commitment of insanity acquittees, in theory at least, relates only
to future dangerousness.
37
Nor can we take comfort in the Committee's second justifi-
cation for criminalizing the class that under current insanity tests
would be acquitted. In one breath, the Committee suggests that
the injustice wrought by extending culpability to this class will be
minimal because the class is so small. 8 In the next breath, the
Committee urges the benefits to the criminal justice system of
convicting members of this meager class who should and would
have been convicted but for the vagaries of existing insanity
formulations. 39 Playing the numbers both ways is awkward
enough; suggesting that it is better to convict ten nonculpable
persons than to let one malingerer go free is strange talk
indeed.
40
The remaining justifications advanced by the Committee for
narrowing the insanity defense form a catalog of the criticisms
directed at existing insanity tests. With one exception, all of these
criticisms are equally applicable to section 522. Like other formu-
lations, the section 522 defense is subject to expert domination,
both because it is tied to a factual finding of "mental disease or
defect"41 and because psychiatric experts are required by section
sentences solely because they were found mentally ill and in need of hospitalization. See
note 35 supra.
Furthermore, insanity acquittees committed under § 3613 are likely to be deemed by
the courts to be entitled to the least restrictive form of confinement and/or treatment
consistent with their mental condition and degree of dangerousness. See generally
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 1107 (1972). The application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine will of ne-
cessity be more restrictive for those committed while awaiting or serving criminal sen-
tences under §§ 3614-15.
37 To the extent that theory does not conform to practice, see note 49 infra, the better
approach would seem to be to reform the practice rather than to adulterate the theory.
38 JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107 n.63.
39 Id. But cf. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 131, 110 P. 1020, 1028 (1910) (Rudkin,
C.J., concurring): "[T]he remedy for acquittals through maudlin sentiment or in re-
sponse to popular clamor must be sought by correcting false notions, and not by destroy-
ing the safeguards of private liberty."
40 Even if we can agree on who "should" have been acquitted by reason of insanity, it
is unlikely that the number of persons "improperly" acquitted is very large. Most persons
who might qualify for the defense never go to trial on the issue. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 23-24; Morris, supra note 1, at 519.
41 See note 9 supra. See also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir.
1967); 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 225 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.).
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3617 (c)(4)(B) to give conclusory testimony on whether the men-
tal disease or defect operated to negate the defendant's mens rea
at the time of the offense.42 Like other formulations, section 522
is likely to remain a "rich man's defense" 43 because section
3617(b) denies the indigent accused the right to an independent
psychiatrist. Like M'Naghten,4 4 section 522 emphasizes cognitive
mental functioning to the exclusion of all else. Like other formu-
lations, section 522 mingles vague medical terms (mental disease
or defect) unintelligible to lawyers with an unrelated moral-legal
term (mens rea).45 Like many existing procedural provisions, sec-
tion 3613 insures that those few persons who are acquitted
under section 522 will be hospitalized indefinitely if found to be
mentally ill and dangerous.
46
The one criticism of existing insanity tests that section 522
does attempt to resolve is that psychiatric resources have been
misallocated to the guilt-determination process when they could
be devoted to treatment. If the courts adopt the strict lemon-
squeezing view of section 522, a contingency that is questioned
below, 47 then the number of defendants raising the insanity de-
fense will probably drop, thereby reducing the allocation of
psychiatric resources to determinations of guilt.48 The possibility
that such gains may be offset by other demands on psyshiatric
resources by other provisions of S. 1 is not considered in the
Committee Staff's Report.
49
42 If the courts respond to § 522's limitation on the insanity defense, as I believe they
will, by articulating a broader mens rea defense, see text accompanying notes 100-31 infra,
expert conclusions will continue to dominate the adjudication stage.
43 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 108 n.65.
44 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4' The Report confesses this defect but notes that "the reduction in availability of the
defense reduces the harm and impact of the necessary vagueness." JUDICIARY COMM.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 110. That statement may be applicable to other defects in
§ 552 as well.
46 Even in jurisdictions that do not make commitment of insanity acquittees auto-
matic, in practice commitment ensues in virtually every case. See Pugh, The Insanity
Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 87, 92 n.8. See also Goldstein, supra note 1 at 132-33.
47 See notes 100-31 infra and accompanying text.
48 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
49 For example, hearings required by §§ 3614-15 for hospitalization of persons who
under other insanity tests might have been acquitted will require some psychiatric par-
ticipation in an adversary setting. Similarly, persons committed under these sections may
be hospitalized for longer periods than if they had been civilly committed. Cf. Burt, Of
Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 258, 261
(1974): "The systematic empirical research available in current literature has uniformly
found that those persons caught in the 'criminal-insane' statuses are as a rule confined
1976]
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The policy of getting psychiatrists out of the courtroom has
multiple objectives, 50 not all of them commendable. To the ex-
tent that the draftsmen wish to end "the unseemly battle of the
experts,"' 5 1 their solution seems misdirected. The battle becomes
unseemly only when the experts stray beyond their expertise
into opinions on law and morality, whether such wanderings are
the result of their own foibles or the law's specific requests.52
Legislators might more profitably direct their efforts toward
limiting the experts to testimony on their clinical assessments of
a defendant's mental functioning at the time of the alleged
offense. 53  Presumably, public disagreement between two
psychiatrists over such clinical judgments does not diminish their
stature or that of their profession.
Thus the Senate draftsmen address deficiencies in the oper-
ation of current insanity defense formulations by reducing the
availability (and visibility) of the defense rather than by attempt-
ing to cure the deficiences. 54 The draftsmen seem to perceive
the defense as having failed as a mechanism for diversion of the
sick offender to non-punitive treatment, a point already con-
ceded by others on both practical55 and constitutional 56 grounds.
Hence, the primary drafting efforts in S. 1 for mentally abnor-
mal offenders have been directed toward tightening up disposi-
tion procedures to insure such offenders' detention until they
are no longer dangerous. 57 What is missing is an effort to recon-
for longer terms than comparable persons who are socially labeled either 'criminal' or
'insane' alone." See also text accompanying note 37 supra.
50 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
51 Id.
'2 See Wales, The Rise, the Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical Model, 63 GEO. L.J.
87, 91-93 (1974). Compare Psychiatric News, Feb. 5, 1974, at 23, col. 1 (Dr. Alan Stone,
urging psychiatrists to stay out of the courtroom) with Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adver-
sary Process, SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1974, at 18.
'3 Section 3617(c)(4)(B) takes directly the opposite approach, requiring psychiatrists to
report in conclusory terms whether the defendant's mental disease or defect negated the
mental elements in the crimes charged.
"4 See note 45 supra.
" See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 219.56 See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J.) (interpreting D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-301(a), (d) (1967) to require pre-commitment hearing for insanity ac-
quittees with procedures substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceedings,
avoiding equal protection issue). See generally Note, Commitment of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity: The Example of the District of Columbia, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 733 (1974);
Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the
Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 924 (1968).
-7 See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1975); JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 7, at 1000-18.
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cile the changes wrought by section 522 with the criminal law's
concept of culpability and fully to rationalize the preventive con-
finement scheme created by the new dispositional provisions.
B. Abolition-A Second Look
Dean Morris, whose stylish article may well have been the
basis for the lemon-squeezing version of section 522,58 addresses
the culpability issue somewhat more fully than the Senate
draftsmen, although he too is primarily concerned with remov-
ing psychiatrists from the courtroom to the correctional process.
In so doing, he passes over the impact of his proposal on the
emerging jurisprudence of preventive confinement.
Dean Morris begins by suggesting that current formulations
of the insanity defense are too narrow. By conditioning the de-
fense on a finding of mental disease or defect, the law ignores
other equally potent impairments to the exercise of free will,
such as "dwelling in a Negro ghetto. '59 If we are unwilling to
recognize a broader defense of incapacity, a solution which, he
argues, "would politically be intolerable,"60 then we do no great
injustice to eliminate the excuse based on mental illness.61
But what is meant by "politically . . . intolerable?" Dean
Morris seems to suggest that because dwelling in a black ghetto is
more criminogenic than being mentally ill, the former is a more
58 Morris, supra note 1. It is unlikely, however, that Dean Morris would support the
dispositional provisions of §§ 3611-17. Id. 529-36.
59 Id. 520.
60ld.
"' This argument is bolstered by (1) the trend toward elimination of capital punish-
ment, (2) the low incidence of the insanity defense, and (3) the problem of informal
double stigmatization. Id. 518-19, 524-25. See note 31 supra.
The premise of point (2) above, incidentally, is highly doubtful. While it is true that
the insanity defense itself is none too often invoked, it may well be that many accused
who might otherwise have availed themselves of the defense are instead diverted to
treatment facilities before reaching a full trial. One such diversion method is the compe-
tency hearing; formerly, if at such a hearing the accused was found incompetent to stand
trial, under most statutes he was confined for such indeterminate period as it might take
him to gain competency. See Burt & Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Incompetency
Plea, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 66, 66-67 n.4 (1972). But see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972) (Blackmun, J.) (incompetency commitment cannot exceed "reasonable" period of
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of defendant's attain-
ing capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. Thus prosecutors may be pressed to
negotiate pleas through, say, a finding of incompetency to stand trial, see A. BROOKS,
LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 332 (1974), but such pressure might
well be reduced if the breadth of the insanity defense were narrowed by S. 1.
For a discussion of the abuse of competency hearings, see Ennis, C.L. U. Client "Crazy
but Competent," reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra at 334-37.
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compelling defense than the latter.62 But being mentally healthy
may also be more criminogenic than being mentally ill.6 3 The
issue is not what condition is most criminogenic but what condi-
tion so deprives an individual of the capacity for free choice that
he cannot be held responsible for his conduct. And just as juries
now convict in all but the most extreme cases of mental abnor-
mality, one might expect a similar pattern should "dwelling in a
Negro ghetto" become admissible evidence on the issue of crimi-
nal responsibility. 64 Nor would such a pattern suggest moral in-
consistency in the law.65 Our only inconsistency is in failing to
allow the jury to hear all evidence relevant to a defendant's
capacity for free choice. For it is the jury, not legal scholars, who
are best situated and best equipped, assuming access to relevant
evidence, to determine moral guilt.66
But having dismissed one aspect of criminal responsibility67
for its underinclusiveness, Dean Morris then argues for the re-
tention of the aspect of moral responsibility borne by the objec-
tive version of mens rea. Accidental (non-negligent) criminal con-
duct and the delusional mistake of fact will continue to excuse
whereas the offender who accurately perceives what he is doing
but is powerless to exercise moral judgment will suffer convic-
tion, imprisonment, and involuntary medical treatment.68 In
62 Morris, supra note 1, at 520.
63 See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U.PA. L. REv. 439
(1974).
64 One is tempted to speculate how a defense lawyer who intended to raise such a
defense might proceed in selecting a jury. My own guess is that upper middle class,
educated whites would be preferred over ghetto blacks.
65 See Kadish, supra note 1, at 284 ("It is never a reason for adding to injustice that
we are already guilty of some."); H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 133 ("The point is that our
attitudes toward volitional impairment can change, and the criminal law can change with
them"); 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at 6377: "So long as we do not know what really
,causes' crime, the insanity defense will have to be framed in a way which permits juries
to express the feelings of the community on the subject of responsibility."
66 "[The insanity defense represents] a normative standard applied to conflicting
clusters of fact and opinion by a jury, an institution which is the traditional embodiment
of community morality and, therefore, well suited to determining whether a particular
defendant, and his act, warrant condemnation rather than compassion." Id. 6377. See also
note 136 in ra & accompanying text.
67 Dean Morris eschews consideration of the defense of automatism or involun-
tariness in his analysis. See Morris, supra note 1, at 528 n.33. Presumably his argument
would extend to abolishing that defense as well.
68 Under S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3614 (1975), a convicted person suffering from
a mental disease or defect may be involuntarily hospitalized upon motion of the Gov-
ernment after a hearing and an appropriate judicial determination. The insanity acquit-
tee, on the other hand, may be hospitalized only if "his release would create a substantial
danger to himself or to the person or property of another." Id. § 3613(a).
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short, Dean Morris has rejected Lady Wootton's logical extension
of his argument to postpone all considerations of culpability to
the disposition proceeding.6 9 But why? For purposes of impos-
ing blame, the conduct of the Hadfields 70 and M'Naghtens
would seem no more opprobrious than that of the lemon-
squeezing spouse-killer. For purposes of deterrence, we may
achieve greater success in punishing accidental behavior not ris-
ing to criminal negligence than we do in punishing violent street
crime.7 ' Behavior-modifying treatment is clearly worth consider-
ing for the lemon-squeezing spouse-killer and may benefit the
accident-prone as well; both types of offenders may pose the
danger of future harm. Dean Morris' distinction poses many of
the same difficulties as the current insanity defense.
From a larger perspective, Dean Morris sees his proposal for
elimination of the insanity defense as a first step on the low road
toward elimination of the concept of retribution from crim-
inal law.
72
There is a choice. We could follow the pattern of
gradually extending the exculpatory and allegedly de-
stigmatizing defense of insanity to cover larger and
larger slices of criminal conduct, until it encompasses
most criminal behavior. Many working in this field
favor the engulfing process. I do not oppose their pur-
pose, but I do think their political judgment is wrong.
7 3
But Dean Morris' first step is not the most logical, only the most
politically acceptable. And it is not clear that those who would
"expand" the insanity defense by eliminating the restriction of
mental disease or defect are aiming for the same goal. There
may yet be utility in perpetuating our constructs of free will and
blame in the face of mounting psychological evidence that free
69 B. WOOTTON, supra note 1.
70 Hadfield's Case, 27 Howell St. Tr. 1282 (K.B. 1800). Hadfield, who had brain
damage from a war wound, attempted to assassinate King George III to save the world.
" See Zimring & Hawkins, Deterrence and Negligent Behavior: A Preliminary Note
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author), reporting on a 1965 study of key-
losing behavior in a midwestern automobile plant and finding such behavior deterrable.
See also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENcE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
128-41 (1973).
72 See Morris, supra note 1, at 526: "1 do not believe that systems of justice can long
survive in which name calling and vengeance figure so prominently. If this be so, then
the issue we are debating becomes one of how we can destigmatize our criminal law
processes as rapidly as possible."
73 Id.
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will is illusory. Empirical evidence abounds for "the proposition
that an individual's perception of personal responsibility or free
will affects his behavior in important ways. ' 74 Until it can be
shown that the insanity defense and related responsibility de-
fenses do not "[reinforce] the average citizen's belief in his own
personal responsibility, '75 we may be better off maintaining the
criminal law's emphasis on culpability.
76
Dean Morris himself illustrates our reliance on the principle
of blameworthiness, observing that sentencing and parole deci-
sions which reflect judgments of the offender's potential
dangerousness are frequently made "[w]ithin the ambit of power
defined by other purposes (most of them retributive). ' 77 Because
our ability to predict future dangerousness and to "cure" antiso-
cial propensities is so tenuous, he argues, we should not create
state power over a criminal's life on those bases alone. 78 Yet he
has done just that by making the insane offender criminally
liable for his conduct: He would defuse retribution as a justi-
fication for confinement by abolishing a significant aspect of
culpability. Nor would deterrence be greatly advanced by
criminalizing the insane. Society's real purposes in confining
such offenders, for the most part, would be prevention and
treatment.
The key point is that retribution and accompanying notions
of blameworthiness constitute a substantial restraint on state
power over the individual. 79 If we are to extend state power over
individuals to the substantially blameless in an attempt to eradi-
cate their dangerous propensities, we should do so directly and
openly under the rubric of a new jurisprudence of preventive
confinement rather than indirectly by warping traditional con-
cepts of criminal accountability. The direct approach would
74 Monahan, supra note 1, at 721.
71 Id. 723. Professor Monahan postulates two psychological processes, neither of
which has empirical support and either of which could occur in response to the law's
embracing the insanity defense: (1) the "process of contrast," by which persons "contrast
their own 'normal' behavior with that of the defendant" and thereby gain an increased
sense of their own responsibility, and (2) the process of "assimilation," by which persons
might respond to acquittals by questioning their own capacity to control their conduct. Id.
724-25.
76 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 223-26; 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at 6378-79
(statement of Prof. Abraham S. Goldstein). See generally Reich, Reflections, THE NEW
YORKER, June 19, 1971, at 52.
77 Morris, supra note 1, at 532-33.
78 Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 637-44 (1966).
79 See generally Kadish, supra note 1, at 287-89.
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focus our attention on the real values at issue when the state
seeks power to confine and treat those whose propensities
we fear.
Most important of the unresolved issues in our jurispru-
dence of preventive confinement is the problem of propor-
tionality.80 Dean Morris' proposal would make confinement
proportional with a proven past offense. Yet the primary
rationale for such a link lies in retribution and deterrence,
policies that are not seriously advanced by convicting the insane.
If our real reasons for confinement are primarily preventive,
then our theory of proportionality should be fixed on those
harms we hope to prevent and on the degree of certainty with
which we may anticipate such harms. 81 Dean Morris' proposal
would mask this issue from view.
82
The dispositional provisions of S. 1 illustrate how Dean
Morris' proposal can be misused. In addition to "punishing" the
insane for their past conduct, S. 1 would preventively confine
the offender until he "has recovered from his mental disease or
defect to such an extent that his release would no longer create a
substantial danger. '83 Even if a reviewing court applies notions
of proportionality to the latter, more obviously preventive por-
tion of an offender's confinement, it will be shielded from
scrutiny of the initial sentence which, though administered
largely for preventive reasons, will appear nominally as a term of
"punishment" (involving primarily retribution and deterrence)
80 See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1277, 1321-24 (1973). See also Dershowitz, Indeterminate Con-
finement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 328-38 (1974).
8, A third element might be our capacity to alter the predicted behavior.
82 Professor Dershowitz' historical research has shown us that formal and informal
systems of preventive confinement go back to the time of the Normans and seem unlikely
to wither away in the imminent future. Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement
in Anglo-American Law-Part I: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1974); Der-
showitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law-Part 1L The American
Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 781 (1974). His findings support the hypothesis that as
formal criminal conviction becomes more difficult, persons thought to be dangerous but
not convictable are shunted to less formal systems of preventive confinement, much as
the air in a balloon is squeezed from one end to another. In his terms then, Dean Morris
is simply squeezing the preventive confinement end of the balloon and pushing those
currently viewed as lacking criminal responsibility back- into the criminal justice system.
The alternative urged here is that we confront the reality of preventive confinement and
develop a jurisprudence to either tame or eliminate it. Whether pursuit of this alternative
will cause other air pockets to form--e.g., the expansion of surveillance and intelligence
systems-remains to be seen.
83 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3616 (1975).
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for past conduct. The state will have won two periods of preven-
tive confinement for the price of one.
C. Constitutional Considerations
Oddly enough, Dean Morris' one-step-at-a-time approach to
the destigmatization of the criminal law may be more difficult to
square with the constitutional precepts of substantive due pro-
cess and cruel and unusual punishment than Lady Wootton's
more radical proposal of a totally behaviorist approach. For as
long as courts view stigmatization as a significant component of
criminal conviction, they will impute to the criminal conviction a
quantum of blameworthiness greater than that reflected in the
objective 84 version of mens rea.85 Efforts to exclude defenses to
the larger notion ,of culpability will thus be viewed with some
suspicion, particularly when such defenses are as deeply imbed-
ded in common law as are insanity and automatism.
That such defenses are so deeply imbedded in the common
law may account for the infrequency of legislative attempts to
eliminate the insanity defense and the consequent lack of case
law on the constitutionality of such efforts. Only two states have
seriously attempted to abolish this defense,86 while a third at-
tempted to transfer the power to rule on insanity to experts and
thus beyond the court's jurisdiction.87 Perhaps the best statement
of the matter is found in the plurality opinion in State v.
Strasburg,88 wherein the Washington supreme court, on state
constitutional grounds, invalidated a statute excluding evidence
of insanity from criminal trials. The defendant's sanity at the
time of the act charged, ruled three of the justices, is "as much a
substantive fact, going to make up his guilt, as the fact of his
'4 The "objective" version of mens rea is that version that refuses to find culpability
without an erroneous perception of fact.
8- See generally note 17 supra.
86 See Sinclair v. United States, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (per curiam)
(invalidating Act of Apr. 3, 1928, ch. 75, [1928] Miss. Gen. Laws 92, on state due process
grounds, with three of six justices authoring or joining in concurring opinions, 161 Miss.
at 154-71, 132 So. at 582-88, attacking statute on federal due process and eighth
amendment grounds); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910) (invalidating
Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 7, [1909] Wash. Sess. Laws 891, on state due process
grounds, with at least three and possibly a majority of justices, 60 Wash. at 110-32,
110 P. at 1020-28, finding statute violative of right to jury trial under state constitution).
See also Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
'7 See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) (invalidating Act of Dec. 18,
1928, [1928] La. Acts Extra Sess. 34).
88 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
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physical commission of the act."'89 These justices explained:
If he was insane at the time to the extent that he could
not comprehend the nature and quality of the act-in
other words, if he had no will to control the physical act
of his physical body, how can it in truth be said that the
act was his act? To take from the accused the opportu-
nity to offer evidence tending to prove this fact, is, in
our opinion, as much a violation of his constitutional
right of trial by jury as to take from him the right to
offer evidence before the jury tending to show that he
did not physically commit the act or physically set in
motion a train of events resulting in the act.90
At first glance, this reasoning suggests that evidence of insanity
may be relevant to negate any or all of the three major compo-
nents of criminal liability-mens rea, actus reus, and causation.91
By subsequently suggesting that the insanity defense must be
permitted even in crimes of strict liability, 92 the justices clearly
indicated that the defense goes to a concept of culpability
broader than mens rea. Thus they may have viewed insanity as
going to the defendant's capacity for criminal responsibility-an
issue not necessarily raised directly by the elements of mens rea,
actus reus, and causation, but one that could not be taken from
the jury's ultimate consideration of guilt or innocence.
Although Strasburg was based on the state constitution, its
reasoning could be used in a federal constitutional challenge.
The factual distinction between the total abolition statute in
Strasburg and the near total abolitionary rule of S. l's section 522
should give little comfort to the Senate draftsmen. 93 The
Washington justices clearly viewed evidence of insanity to be
relevant (and therefore constitutionally nonexcludable) to as-
pects of culpability beyond those reflected in the defense of mis-
take of fact. Moreover, S. l's apparent exclusion of an involun-
tariness defense to the conduct element would render section
522 unconstitutional under the Strasburg reasoning.94
8 9 d. at 119, 110 P. at 1024.9 0 Id. Although phrased in terms of the right to a jury trial, the justices' argument
more closely resembles a substantive due process approach.
91 Cf. Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished
Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 313, 327-28 (1971).
92 60 Wash. at 120-21, 110 P. at 1024.
'3 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 252.
94 See note 24 supra. The Brown Commission's minority proposal was that evidence
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More recently, five United States Supreme Court Justices
have stated in dictum that punishment of involuntary conduct
may violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment. In Powell v. Texas95 Mr. Justice White joined the four
dissenters in suggesting that if a defendant acted under compul-
sion (in that case, compulsion from intoxication), his conviction
would violate the eighth amendment.96 Although the Court was
unwilling, and quite properly so, to freeze experimentation with
insanity defense formulations by articulating a constitutional
formula for involuntariness, 97 a majority was willing to require at
least some defense based on the impairment of free will.
It would be folly to state categorically that, assuming adop-
tion of the lemon-squeezing interpretation, section 522 will be
ruled unconstitutional.9" But one can predict that many courts
will be less than overwhelmed by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's scanty justification for so major a departure from com-
mon law tradition on the culpability issue. Given judicial
reluctance to constitutionalize the insanity defense, 99 the more
probable fate of section 522 in the courts is that it will be con-
strued in such a manner as to resolve indirectly the serious
and difficult constitutional questions it provokes. It is to this
subject that we now turn.
III. ENLARGING MENS REA
Motivated by constitutional concerns and the policy interests
in not "depriv[ing] the criminal law of its chief paradigm of free
of mental disease or defect be admissible to negate any element of the crime, including
the voluntariness requirement which the Commission included in its actus reus provi-
sions. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 234.
95 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
96 Id. at 548-54 (White, J., concurring); id. at 565-70 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
97 A generation ago the Court in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952),
refused to hold that the "irresistible impulse" test of insanity is "implicit in the concept of
order liberty." If Leland is still good law (and the relevant dicta in Powell do not criticize
it), then not every involuntary action caused by mental illness is constitutionally pro-
tected from criminal prosecution.
98 See note 97 supra.
9' Consider, for example, the following testimony of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.:
Justice Frankfurter told me privately that he intended to make every effort to
avoid a Supreme Court ruling on the definition of the "insanity" defense. The
matter was too fluid, too susceptible of change, too much oriented to the indi-
vidual case for a Supreme Court pronouncement to do anything other than
misdirect the development of the law in this area.
1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 228-29. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
376 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.): "Certainly, denial of constitutional power of commitment to
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will,"100 courts may capitalize on two analytical footholds to cir-
cumvent the narrow lemon-squeezing interpretation of section
522: (1) the suggestion in some provisions of S. 1 of a concept of
culpability broader than mere awareness of conduct, circum-
stances, and results, and (2) judicial experience with the defense
of diminished capacity. Both approaches would enable a review-
ing court to broaden the section 522 defense by broadening the
concept of mens rea in sections 301 and 302 to reflect a larger,
less objective concept of culpability. Both lead to revival of an
insanity defense similar to existing formulations at the expense
of muddying the attempt to articulate an objective view of mens
rea in sections 301 and 302.
The first approach begins with section 522 itself. If evidence
of mental disease or defect is relevant only to establish the ab-
sence of a mens rea element, then section 522 would seem redun-
dant given sections 301 and 302 and the mistake-of-fact-or-law
defense in section 521.101 To avoid the redundancy, it has been
argued,10 2 one might assume that section 522 has reference to
aspects of culpability beyond those reflected in sections 301 and
302, and that the term "mental disease or defect" adds substan-
tively to mens rea. The argument is bolstered by the absence of
any voluntariness requirement in the conduct sections of S. 1.103
A court might infer from this omission either that the draftsmen
intentionally abolished involuntariness as a defense, a conclusion
creating serious constitutional tensions, or that they meant to
transfer considerations of voluntariness to the mens rea elements
of sections 301 and 302.104 The latter view would allow the de-
Congress in dealing with a situation like this ought not to rest on dogmatic adherence to
one view or another on controversial psychiatric issues."
100 H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 132.
101 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 521 (1975) provides:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, as a result of
ignorance or mistake concerning.a matter of fact or law, the defendant lacked
the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Except as
otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake concerning a matter of fact or law
does not otherwise constitute a defense.
102 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 219 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.).
103 See note 24 supra.
104 Section 501 gives the courts authority to infer defenses not specified in S. I but
forbids expansion of named defenses beyond the limits of the statute. Although the
specific language of § 522 would prohibit evidence of mental disease or defect for any
purpose other than to negate mens rea (e.g., to negate the conduct element in § 102), this
language does not prevent a court from reading the mens rea provisions (§§ 301-02) more
expansively. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 207.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.: 124:687
fendant to raise the issue of his ability to control his conduct,10 5
quite apart from his ability correctly to perceive what he was
doing, and to apply evidence of mental disease or defect,
through section 522, to the resolution of that issue.
The principal flaw in this approach is the initial assumption
of redundancy. If section 522 is redundant, so is the similarly
worded section 521 on mistake of fact or law. Yet section 521
does not add substantively to mens rea.10 6 Furthermore, the
draftsmen may have felt section 522 necessary to make explicit
their intent to repeal the judicially created insanity defenses now
operative in the federal system, 10 7 just as section 521 clears up
judicial differences over the role of mistake of fact or law.1
0 8
Nevertheless, if Congress intends to do no more than to lay
down a rule of evidence for the proper scope and relevance of
testimony concerning mental disease or defect in a criminal trial,
that purpose could be more clearly achieved by adding a clause
to sections 301 and 302.109 To set out such a rule separately, in a
subchapter of the statute entitled "Defenses Based on Lack of
Culpability"' 10 is to suggest that the insanity defense has a sub-
stance that the Committee's Staff Report disclaims.
105 Such a construction would also tend to expand current conceptions of the au-
tomatism or involuntariness defense which limit it to cases of somnabulism and occasional
cases of psychomotor epilepsy. E.g., Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879) (evidence
of somnabulism should have been admitted); Bratty v. Attorney-General, [1963] A.C. 386
(H.L. 1961) 3 W.L.R. 965 (H.L.) ("involuntariness" does not include involuntariness due
to disease of mind unless a disease within limits of M'Naghten or automatism (reflex,
convulsive, or unconscious or somnabulistic action) is proven).
'
0 6 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 94. But see 1975 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 228 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.).
107 Additionally, § 522 codifies the holding of Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469
(1895) (nonconstitutional common law decision), placing the burden of persuasion
beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution. Section 522 also purports to focus the
jury's (and the expert witness') consideration of evidence of mental disease or defect on
the issue of mens rea; arguably, current formulations leave the jury at large to do what
they will with evidence of insanity.
For existing federal court formulations of the insanity defense, see note 135 infra.
108 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 356-69 (1972); Judiciary
Comm. Staff Report, supra note 7, at 94-97.
109 Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr., has stated:
I would suggest the following additional explanation be added to clarify such an
intent: "Evidence of a mental disease or defect shall be admissible for the pur-
pose of demonstrating that a person was unaware of the factual circumstances of
his conduct or of the existence of a risk, and for no other purposes." This
additional language should be placed in § 301 and § 522 . . . should be
eliminated.
1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 229.
110 The third defense in this subchapter, intoxication (§ 523), is likewise susceptible
of two substantially different interpretations. On a narrow reading, it functions like
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Nor are certain other S. 1 defenses consistent with the
limited concept of culpability suggested by the lemon-squeez-
ing interpretation of section 522. The affirmative defense of
duress in section 531, under the heading "Defenses Based on
Lack of Volition," exculpates offenders "of reasonable firm-
ness" who are aware of what they are doing but whose powers
of control are impeded by the coercion of "another person."
Provocation is a simple defense to murder for the "ordinary
person," ''  having the effect of downgrading the offense to
manslaughter.112 Reference to the reasonable or ordinary person
in both defenses would presumably preclude their use by one
suffering from mental disease or defect except to the extent that
the provocation or duress would produce the same reaction in
the "reasonable man."' 1 3 And in any event, constitutional con-
cerns may cause courts to balk at an interpretation that permits
an offender to be exculpated for an overpowering of the will by
human agency or "ordinary" fits of pique but not by mental
disease or defect.'
1 4
Further inducement to allow the objective view of mens rea in
sections 301 and 302 to be "pried open" by section 522 comes
from state court experience with the defense of diminished
capacity. Since practically every American jurisdiction maintains
a separate insanity defense along the lines of either M'Naghten or
the American Law Institute formulation, 1 5 the function of the
mistake of fact or law and the lemon-squeezing interpretation of § 522 to negate the wnens
rea element of "intent" or "knowledge." Section 523, however, precludes the use of the
defense to negate a mens rea element of recklessness or negligence. As such, § 523 is a
limitation of the general defense suggested by §§ 301-02 and not a separate defense. On
a broader reading, intoxication, like mental disease or defect, may suggest a notion of
culpability broader than that reflected in the objective view of mnens rea. Like § 522, § 523
can be seen as infusing aspects of the defendant's capacity for judgment and control of
his actions into §§ 301-02. See People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458, 462 P.2d 370, 379, 82
Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (1969):
[A] drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do something simple, such as
strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of uncon-
sciousness. What he is not as capable as a sober man of doing is exercising
judgment about the social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses
towards antisocial acts.
ill S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1601(b) (1975).112 1d. § 1602(a)(2).
"' This statement would not be true if a court were to read into the subjective
language "in the position of the defendant" the fact of the defendant's mental disease or
defect. See note 14 supra. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 197-98.
114 See notes 85-98 supra & accompanying text.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
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diminished capacity defense is to allow the jury to consider
psychological evidence insufficient to exculpate totally for the
purpose of downgrading the level of culpability attaching to the
defendant's criminal conduct. By its very nature, the defense
suggests a notion of culpability broader than mere awareness of
conduct, circumstances, and results. Nevertheless, the defense is
normally used to negate a mens rea element required by the
definition of the offense. 1 6 Hence, courts adopting the de-
fense have had to broaden their mens rea definitions to en-
compass more than mere conscious awareness.
California provides the textbook illustrations. In People v.
Gorshen,1 7 evidence of "uncontrollable compulsion" was deemed
relevant to suggest the absence of malice aforethought, the men-
tal element required for second degree murder, even though
such evidence was excludable on the issue of the insanity defense
since California had rejected the irresistible impulse test." 8 In
People v. Wolff, 19 the first degree murder requirement of a will-
ful, deliberate, and premeditated killing was interpreted to in-
clude consideration of the "extent to which this defendant could
maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contem-
plated act.' 20 The purpose of such inquiry was to assess "the
quantum of his moral turpitude and depravity.' 21 And in People
v. Conley122 the court ruled that a defendant could not be found
to have acted with malice aforethought if he were "unable to
comprehend his duty to govern his actions in accord with the
duty imposed by law.'
123
To be sure, the mens rea elements under review in the above
cases are not precisely those set out in sections 301 and 302 of
S. 1. But the process that the California courts underwent to ad-
just what had previously been a primarily objective concept Qf
mens rea, rendering it more subjective to accommodate evi-
dence of mental abnormality, is critical to evaluating the likely
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
But see State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870) ("product" test similar to Durham).
116 Dix, supra note 91, at 324-27.
117 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), noted in 12 STAN. L. REV. 226 (1959).
118 Id. at 727, 336 P.2d at 498-99.
119 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
120 Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (emphasis in original).
121 Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
122 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
123 Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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fate of section 522.124 The primary advantage of such a process
is that, unlike the all or nothing proposition of the separate
insanity defense, it permits more refined judgments of an
offender's culpability. The primary disadvantage is that to reach
such refined judgments, some degree of chaos must be endured
as courts struggle to rewrite mens rea to harmonize it with mod-
ern psychological theory.' 25 Along the way, expert witnesses and
trial judges must suffer the indignity of petty intellectual dishon-
esties as testimony is bent to the demands of materiality and
relevance. And, in the end, the process may turn out to be less
effective than the separate insanity defense in bringing to the
trier of fact all psychological evidence bearing on culpability. As
Professor Dix has noted of the California experience: "Despite
the effort the court has expended, it has gone no further than to
develop the cognitive aspects of the state of mind requirements.
... It does not .. provide a satisfactory vehicle for doctrinal
analysis of more complex and sophisticated problems ... 12
Thus, judicial construction could transform section 522 into
a cross between M'Naghten and Durham-the former because of
the emphasis on cognition in Sections 301 and 302,127 the latter
because the issue of mental illness negating a mental element so
closely resembles the Durham issue of productivity. 28 Such a
course will surely thwart the draftsmen's hopes of removing
psychiatrists from the courtroom 29 and is unlikely to improve
communication among judge, expert witness, and jury. Nor
does it begin to resolve the principal problem plaguing the
insanity defense today, that of "expert dominance.' 130 By in-
sisting on a factual finding of mental disease or defect, section
124 For another example of this process, see Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59
(4th Cir. 1960) (mens rea element of knowledge interpreted to include "capacity to know,"
on which psychiatric evidence deemed relevant).
125 For evidence of this chaos and the highly subjective decisions that may result,
compare the majority and dissenting opinions in People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423
P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967).
126 Dix, supra note 91, at 331. For a discussion of the California experience in modi-
fying mens rea definitions, see id. 328-32.
127 The California experience emphasizing cognitive aspects of mental capacity must
be evaluated in the context of a parallel full insanity defense derived from M'Naghten.
The absence of a separate S. I insanity defense could conceivably lead the federal courts
to view mens rea even more subjectively than the California courts.
12' See note 12 supra.
' 
9 See notes 47-53 supra & accompanying text.
130 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 224 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
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522 perpetuates our modern tradition of asking medical, ex-
perts to resolve for us the moral and legal issue of criminal
responsibility.
131
IV. ALTERNATIVES
In urging the abolition of a separate insanity defense, Dean
Morris observed, "It too often is overlooked that one group's
exculpation from criminal responsibility confirms the inculpa-
tion of other groups."' 32 That simple perception provides as well
the principal justification for retention of the defense. For it is
through the on-going, case-by-case process of exculpating the
non-responsible that society evolves its concepts of individual
autonomy and acrountability. As long as we retain our commit-
ment to the political ideal that an individual is able in some
degree to control his own destiny, we shall resist efforts to elimi-
nate our principal mechanism for testing that capacity in our
criminal law.133 If we abolish in large measure the defense of
blamelessness, we detract from our ability to impose blame. The
number of offenders so exculpated is likely to remain small; they
are the exception we use to prove the rule of personal accounta-
bility. Symbolically, their significance outstrips the social gains to
be realized by submitting them to our largely ineffective correc-
tional process.
What, then, should Congress do about the insanity defense?
There is little to be gained by adopting the recommendation of
the Brown Commission.134 Because virtually every circuit has
adopted a close facsimile of that test 35 and because it fails to
I See id.; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); note 53 supra.
12 Morris, supra note 1, at 520.
1M3 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 223-26; 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at
6378-79 (statement of Prof. Abraham S. Goldstein).
134 Report of the National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 194 (1971):
§ 503. Mental Disease or Defect
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a resut of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law. "Mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. Lack of
criminal responsibility under this section is a defense.
135 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v.
United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-73 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908,
915-16 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); United
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answer the principal criticisms of the insanity defense respecting
expert dominance and the illogical strictures of the medical
model, legislation would achieve no more than to curtail what
limited experimentation exists today. Indeed, one may doubt
any special competence of a legislative body, dealing with the
issue on an abstract level, to formulate a "test" of criminal re-
sponsibility. The better forum for evolving our notions of per-
sonal accountability and measuring them against our developing
knowledge of human behavior may be, as Judge Bazelon has
argued, individual cases.136 For it is the individual case which
provides us with bits and pieces of the knowledge we now lack.
And it is the jury, subject to judicial guidance, which, when face
to face with the power to decide the fate of the accused before
them, may be society's most efficacious representative in drawing
the moral line. The first option, then, is for Congress to stay its
hand, to provide procedures for raising a defense of lack of
criminal responsibility, 137 but to leave the substantive "test" to
the common law.
A second option would be to clear away the obstacles of
expert dominance and the medical model which now encumber
full jury consideration of the responsibility issue. Judge
Bazelon's suggested jury instruction represents one such for-
mula: "[A] defendant is not responsible if at the time of his unlaw-
ful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls were
impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his
act.' 38 Like the option of doing nothing, this option leaves the
law of criminal responsibility free to develop with judicial
experience. 39 In addition, it enhances that development by re-
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383
F.2d 680, 684-87 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735-36 (8th Cir.
1967), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622-24 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774
& n.32 (3d Cir. 1961).
... 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 226-28 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Baze-
Ion, Jr.).
137 See, e.g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3612(a), 3617 (1975).
13' United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
139 Appellate supervision of the "justly responsible" test would be altered to the
extent that appellate courts would no longer be able to base their rulings upon formal
definitions of "mental disease or defect." Additionally, the test suggests greater deference
to a properly instructed jury's determination of community standards of blameworthi-
ness. Whether such a test renders the definition more lawless depends on one's percep-
tion of the operation of existing insanity defense formulations. If the element of "mental
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moving the distraction of determining whether a defendant's
condition may properly be termed "mental disease or defect"
and concomitantly reducing the jury's dependence on expert
witnesses. It tells the jury that mental processes are at issue with-
out requiring a particular medical diagnosis. Finally, it focuses
jury attention on what must be the central issue: the balance to
be struck between moral blameworthiness and the concerns of
social order.
140
Neither option addresses the important practical issue of
what is to be done with an offender acquitted for non-
responsibility and perceived as mentally ill and a continuing
threat to others. But that issue should be analytically distinct
from the issue of responsibility irrespective of the legal test
employed.14' Preventive confinement addresses future conduct:
Past conduct is relevant only as a factor for prediction. Whether
or not a jury found the actor criminally responsible for such past
conduct is otherwise irrelevant to a determination of preventive
confinement. 142 Indeed, one hidden benefit of the second op-
tion, the "justly responsible" test,' 43 may be that it will force us to
confront the real issues in preventive confinement which now lie
masked behind the "special verdict" of "not guilty by rea-
son of insanity.
'"144
disease or defect" in current formulations is simply an excuse for the expert witness to
inject into the record personal judgments on the ultimate issue of responsibility, see note
131 supra, then current practice may be as insulated from appellate scrutiny as the 'Justly
responsible" approach.
140 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 226 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.). This standard has also been suggested as the most appropriate way to deal with
psychological evidence that might warrant a finding of diminished capacity but not total
exculpation. See Dix, supra note 91, at 333-34.
141 See note 56 supra.
142 Lack of capacity to control given conduct in one set of circumstances does not
necessarily imply lack of capacity to control other conduct in other circumstances. For
one thing, the underlying mental disability may have undergone spontaneous remission.
For another, the disordered thinking may be limited to one particular deed, as when one
spouse kills another believing the victim to be the devil.
143 See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
144 Such is the terminology employed in S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3612(b) (1975).
